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First and foremost it must be emphasised that the Court has a judicial 
and not a political mandate. Its function is clearly spelt out in [section] 
71(2) [of the Interim Constitution]: to certify whether all the provisions 
of the NT [New Text] comply with the CPs [Constitutional Principles]. 
That is a judicial function, a legal exercise. Admittedly a constitution, by 
its very nature, deals with the extent, limitations and exercise of political 
power as also with the relationship between political entities and with 
the relationship between the state and persons. But this Court has no 
power, no mandate and no right to express any view on the political 
choices made by the CA [Constitutional Assembly] in drafting the NT, 
save to the extent that such choices may be relevant either to compliance or 
non-compliance with the CPs.1
I. intrOdUCtiOn
 What did “We, the People of South Africa” expect from the social order that was 
to emerge from the newly-minted Constitution in 1996? The simple answer is that 
“we” sought not only to end an authoritarian regime but also to transcend its arbitrary 
and brutal nature and replace it with a society based on principles of accountability, 
transparency, and integrity—or, if you wish, the rule of law.
 In a typically-thoughtful piece, Stu Woolman2 suggests that the Constitutional 
Court’s understanding of our ambition may have been that it was carefully crafted as 
a modest, incremental journey toward the legitimacy of the legal system, particularly 
the Court.3
 Did this suggestion mean that the newly established Constitutional Court should 
have adopted a legal humility as it approached the challenge of developing 
jurisprudence and eschewed the imposition of any deep substantive vision of a just 
political order for a democratic South Africa? According to this theory, the Court’s 
main role was to undo the egregious damage caused by the caprice and brutality of 
apartheid by disserting the new Grundnorm—the rule of law.
 Questions about jurisprudential direction confronted the newly established 
constitutional institutions some twenty years ago and continue to challenge our 
1. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para. 27.
2. Stu Woolman is Professor of Law at the University of Witwatersrand.
3. Stu Woolman, Humility, Michelman’s Method and the Constitutional Court: Rereading the First 
Certification Judgment and Reaffirming a Distinction Between Law and Politics, 24 Stellenbosch L. 
Rev. 281 (2013). In support of this proposition, Woolman cites to Michael Walzer writing about 
marchers in the streets of Prague carrying signs with the words “Truth” and “Justice.” Id. at 291–92 
(quoting Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad 1–2 
(1994)). Walzer wrote that “[w]hat they meant by the ‘ justice’ inscribed on their signs, however, was 
simple enough: an end to arbitrary arrests, equal and impartial law enforcement, the abolition of the 
privileges and prerogatives of the party elite –common, garden variety justice.” Michael Walzer, 
Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad 2 (1994). In this passage, Walzer is 
referring to marches that took place in late 1989 as part of a series of events, commonly called the Velvet 
Revolution—a nonviolent campaign that culminated in a transition of power in then-Czechoslovakia.
41
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
assessment of the progress made by the judicial system and in particular, by our 
constitutional society. It is to the responses to these challenges that I shall now turn. 
 Agreement on certain issues can be readily reached. The South African 
Constitution was drafted in response to a history of institutionalized racial oppression 
and arbitrary and capricious rule.4 It was crafted with an understanding of the 
important role that the law played during apartheid’s long history and the manner in 
which it privileged a racial minority.5 In this sense, the Constitution was to be a 
transformative document as opposed to a conservative or “preservative” one.
 It is here that profound differences of opinion exist. Frank Michelman6 describes 
a transformative constitution as:
[F]orward-looking, a charter of direction to a good and a just society that is 
not here—not now, not yet, perhaps not fully and perfectly ever—but rather is 
to be pursued by political and other means under the Constitution’s guidance 
and control. But then of course the Constitution speaks not only as a 
declaration and expression of a national commitment to social transformation 
but as a legal charter for a constitutional state, meaning a state that pursues its 
aims—here, its socially transformative aims—by and under laws made and 
applied in accordance with constitutional supreme law.7
It was this idea of transformation that inspired Karl Klare,8 in arguably the most 
inf luential article published to date on South Africa’s Constitution, to define a 
transformative constitution as:
[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context 
of conducive political developments) to transforming a country’s political and 
social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise 
of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political processes 
grounded in law.9
Under this view, courts were mandated to provide a substantive road map for a 
journey towards a society prefigured by the Constitution.
4. See generally Richard L. Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against 
Apartheid, 1980–1994 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in 
South Africa’s State of Emergency (1992).
5. See generally Abel, supra note 4; Ellmann, supra note 4.
6. Frank I. Michelman is a legal scholar and Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard Law School.
7. Frank I. Michelman, Expropriation, Eviction, and the Gravity of the Common Law, 24 Stellenbosch L. 
Rev. 245, 245 (2013).
8. Karl E. Klare is George J. and Kathleen Waters Matthews Distinguished University Professor of Law 
at Northeastern University School of Law and has received recognition for his scholarship on 
transformative constitutionalism.
9. Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 SAJHR 146, 150 (1998).
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 By contrast, Theunis Roux10 has argued that South Africa’s expectations, as 
derived from the Constitution, were directed to a judiciary charged with interpreting 
the Constitution in a far more modest fashion.11 Post-apartheid South Africa had to 
shift from a society based on the primacy of the racist and capricious apartheid 
system to a society based upon the rule of law.12 Thus, the Constitutional Court’s 
primary goal was not to pursue social transformation through the law but rather to 
assert its institutional role in the South African political system as a neutral arbiter of 
major political disputes.13 Only once this institutional role was secure could the 
Court turn its attention to decisions which might have the sort of distributive impact 
that Klare had envisaged in his argument.14
 Although Klare saw the Constitution as directing courts towards the achievement 
of social justice through law, he cautioned against an overly optimistic expectation of 
what jurisprudence would unfold.15 In his view, a conservative but dominant legal 
culture could serve to “[discourage] appropriate constitutional innovation and [lead] 
to less generous . . . interpretations and applications of the Constitution than are 
permitted by the text and drafting history.”16 Klare’s focus on the tension between 
the egalitarian view of the Constitution and a formalistic legal culture—lacking “a 
strong tradition of substantive political discussion and contestation through the 
medium of legal discourses”17—was indeed perceptive. Klare correctly, in my view, 
focused attention on the faith placed by South African lawyers in the “constraining 
power of legal texts and ritual invocation of the law/politics boundary.”18
 Roux responded that “Klare’s call for the judges to [view] . . . the 1996 . . . 
Constitution as a post-liberal project of fundamental . . . political and social 
transformation would have been particularly unappealing” to judges at that time who 
“would have [otherwise] thought that the main drivers [toward social transformation] 
should be the political branches [of the state].”19 According to Roux, “[i]f the 1996 
Constitution represented a political project at all,” it was a project in which the 
judiciary played but a supporting role.20 Given the sentiments expressed by 
10. Theunis Roux is Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales and an expert on South 
African constitutional law. Roux has written extensively and powerfully on the Constitutional Court.
11. See Theunis Roux, The Politics of Principle: The First South African Constitutional 
Court, 1995–2005, at 203–18 (2013).
12. See id. at 191.
13. See id. at 213.
14. See id. at 213–14. 
15. Klare, supra note 9, at 171.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 188.
18. Id. at 171.
19. Roux, supra note 11, at 231.
20. Id.
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politicians,21 the Court, under Roux’s line of argument, has done an admirable job in 
negotiating the law-politics tension to avoid political attacks that would have 
undermined the Court’s legitimacy and prevented it from performing its 
constitutionally mandated role.
 We are thus confronted with two very different visions of the Constitution’s role 
in the reconstruction of South African society and the legal system that underpinned 
it. As South Africa moves into its third decade of democracy, even Roux has 
formulated a different demand from the contemporary Court, bringing his approach 
into far closer alignment with Klare’s than would have been expected. In his present 
position, Roux contends that the “ANC’s [African National Congress] loss of 
political direction and descent into factionalism not only requires the Court to fill 
the policy gap, but has also created the political space [to achieve this objective].”22 
For example, while Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom set out a 
reasonableness review approach to social and economic rights,23 it disappointed those 
who urged the Court to develop a more substantive test.24
21. Notwithstanding a clear difference in vision between these distinguished academics, politicians have, 
understandably, adopted a totally different take on both the Court’s ambition and its record after twenty 
years. For example, in 2013, the then-National Assembly Speaker, Max Sisulu, criticized opposition 
parties, “warning that running to the courts to resolve political issues ran [a] serious risk of [delegitimizing] 
the judiciary.” Wyndham Hartley, Opposition Parties Told Not to Run to Courts, Bus. Day (June 12, 2013), 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2013/06/12/opposition-parties-told-not-to-run-to-courts.
 Sisulu further stated:
[T]here is a danger in South Africa, however, of the politicisation of the judiciary, 
drawing the judiciary into every and all political disputes, as if there is no other forum 
to deal with a political impasse relating to policy or disputes which clearly carry 
polycentric consequences beyond the scope of adjudication.
 Id.
  In 1996, President Jacob Zuma, then-National Chairman of the ANC, reportedly told delegates at a 
regional meeting in Durban that “once you begin to feel you are above the ANC, you are in trouble”; the 
“ANC was ‘more important’ than the [C]onstitution”; “[n]o political force can destroy the ANC—it is only 
the ANC that can destroy itself ”; and that the “[C]onstitution was only there to ‘regulate matters.’” 
Gareth van Onselen, From the Archives: Jacob Zuma and the Constitution, Bus. Day (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/12/03/from-the-archives-jacob-zuma-and-the-constitution.
22. Roux, supra note 11, at 395.
23. 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at paras. 40–44. The Court in Grootboom allowed future courts the room to 
develop upon its initial test. The Grootboom case concerned an application by a homeless community of 
some 900 people for housing pursuant to section 26 of the Constitution. Id. at paras. 3–4, 4 n.2, 13. The 
Constitutional Court held that the right to access adequate housing in section 26 did not equate to a right 
for housing. Id. at para. 35. Hence, the Court eschewed the idea that section 26 imposed an obligation 
on the state to provide a minimum standard of housing. Id. at paras. 37–38. The Court, however, held 
that section 26 mandated the state to take reasonable measures within its available means to cater for the 
needs of the homeless—which included the adoption of measures to deal firstly with the plight of the 
poorest of the poor. Id. at para. 99. 
24. For trenchant criticism of the Grootboom case, see David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental 
Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights 197–200 (2007) and 
Kirsty McLean, Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa 171–203 (2009).
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 If the Grootboom reasonableness review test was an attempt to create a partnership 
with the political branches of the state to vindicate the social rights enshrined in the 
Constitution, Roux now suggests that “the Court . . . needs to focus on spelling out 
the constitutional basis for this partnership. It needs to be more specific, in other 
words, about the content of social rights and more forthright about the Court’s 
legitimate role in setting standards for legislative and executive conduct.”25
 Roux argues that, even though the Court presently finds itself in a far more 
fraught political situation than that at the dawn of democracy—as the ANC appears 
increasingly less committed to the constitutional project—“the Court will need to 
take some risks” in order to “intrude . . . further into politics.”26 In assuming this 
risk, the Court will be required to presume that “the public will accept . . . [an] 
expansion of [the] law’s domain” in order to preserve democratic politics.27
 The ANC’s increasing intolerance of the constitutional project is ref lected in 
statements made by senior ANC leaders. In 2008, the Secretary-General of the 
ANC, Gwede Mantashe, claimed that the Constitutional Court justices were 
employed by “counter-revolutionary forces.”28 In 2011, President Jacob Zuma warned 
the judiciary not to encroach on the domain of policy or the executive’s implementation 
thereof.29 In 2012, a year after Zuma’s warning, current Minister of Mineral 
Resources Ngoako Ramatlhodi reportedly wrote of the Constitution’s f laws that 
gave the courts too much power.30
 Irrespective of the divisions of opinion as to the courts’ appropriate role at the 
dawn of constitutional democracy, the far more fractured state of our present politics 
requires courts to step up to the jurisprudential plate to ensure that both the 
procedural and substantive commitments enshrined in the Constitution percolate 
into the political and economic reality of contemporary South Africa. It is this 
possibility that I consider in the balance of this paper.
ii. MEEting thE prEsEnt ChaLLEngE
 Whatever the conception of the Court’s role after 1996, this new institution was 
confronted with a constitutional text that expressed a majestic vision and a bold faith 
in the establishment of a democratic society predicated on an interrelated series of 
substantive commitments to a good life for all.31
25. Roux, supra note 11, at 395.
26. Id. at 398.
27. Id.
28. Matuma Letsoalo et al., ANC Boss Accuses Judges of Conspiracy Against Zuma, Mail & Guardian (July 
4, 2008), http://mg.co.za/article/2008-07-04-anc-boss-accuses-judges-of-conspiracy-against-zuma.
29. South Africa Must Choose Between Accountability and Blind Trust, Mail & Guardian (July 17, 2015), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-17-south-africa-must-choose-between-accountability-and-blind-trust.
30. Id.
31. Michelman, supra note 7, at 245.
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 If a participatory democracy which transcended historically-constructed divisions 
based on racial thinking, homophobia, xenophobia, and sexism was to be constructed 
from the ashes of apartheid, then the greatest potential threat to this vision was 
arguably the state itself. The government is currently dominated by one political 
party with tenuous commitments to a rights-based culture.32 An ambivalence that 
might not have been apparent during the Mandela era has become a reality in 
present-day South Africa. The Constitution looked to one state institution—the 
judiciary with its unelected members—and charged it with defending a range of 
rights against the other state institutions.33 The Court’s responsibilities include 
safeguarding the Constitution’s social wage provisions, which are required to ensure, 
at a minimum, a socially-acceptable and dignified life for all.34 Roux may have been 
correct to caution against sweeping judgments that would reflect substantive political 
commitment at the inception of the project,35 but far more parlous political 
circumstances now demand this commitment from the judiciary.
 Powerful elements within the private sector represent a second threat to this 
vision. The constitutional transition left private power intact and in mainly white 
hands.36 Those who benefited from apartheid and built powerful private corporations 
could now replicate their co-optive strategies with the new rulers, safe in the 
knowledge of constitutional protection. Back in 1996, Justice Tholie Madala 
reminded the country of this problem in Du Plessis v. De Klerk:
Ours is a multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-lingual society in which the 
ravages of apartheid, disadvantage and inequality are just immeasurable. The 
extent of the oppressive measures in South Africa was not confined to 
government/individual relations but equally to individual/individual relations. 
In its effort to create a new order, our Constitution must have been intended to 
address these oppressive and undemocratic practices at all levels. In my view 
our Constitution starts at the lowest level and attempts to reach the furthest in 
its endeavours to restructure the dynamics in a previously racist society.37
This observation was echoed recently in the Oxfam38 inequality report:
In 2010, South Africa had a Gini coefficient of 0.66, making it one of the 
most unequal societies in the world. The two richest people in South Africa 
have the same wealth as the bottom half of the population. South Africa is 
significantly more unequal than it was at the end of Apartheid. Between 1995 
and 2006, the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty fell 
32. Roux, supra note 11, at 398.
33. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 167.
34. Id. §§ 7–39.
35. Roux, supra note 11, at 398.
36. See Michael MacDonald, Why Race Matters in South Africa 132–33 (2006).
37. 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at para. 163.
38. Oxfam is a confederation of seventeen organizations working in over ninety countries worldwide to find 
solutions to poverty and injustice. Who We Are, Oxfam Int’l, https://www.oxfam.org/en/about (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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slightly to 17 percent. However, increases in population over the same period 
meant that the total number of South Africans living in extreme poverty fell 
by just 102,000. Although real growth in GDP per capita was just under two 
percent, further progress on reducing poverty was hampered by South Africa’s 
extremely high, and growing, level of inequality. Oxfam projections show 
that even on the very conservative assumption that inequality remains static, 
just 300,000 fewer South Africans will be living in absolute poverty by 2019, 
leaving almost eight million people living below the poverty line. Conversely, 
if the Gini continues to increase even by one point, this will lead to 300,000 
more people living in poverty in five years.39
 Significantly, in Capital in the Twenty-First Century—a book that has recently 
brought inequality into sharp focus—Thomas Piketty provides a description of the 
South African Police Service intervening in a conflict between mine workers and 
mine owners at the Marikana platinum mine40 and notes that “[i]f the capital-labor 
split gives rise to so many conf licts, it is due first and foremost to the extreme 
concentration of the ownership of capital. Inequality of wealth—and of the 
consequent income from capital—is in fact always much greater than inequality of 
income from labor.”41
 The point of these observations is not to engage in a lengthy discourse about 
inequality, its causes, or its solutions. It is, however, to argue that inequality and 
private economic power in the hands of a mere small segment of society affect our 
constitutional ambitions and threaten the future of South African democracy—as 
the Marikana massacre illustrated so clearly.
 Courts cannot solve the core problem of inequality or the problems associated 
with the weakening of some non-governmental sectors that continue to show blind 
loyalty to the party that led the country into emancipation but may now fail those 
most desperately in need. Courts need to develop an expanded conception of 
democracy and therefore participate more vigorously with the other arms of state in 
order to ensure that the vision contained in the Constitution is at least defended, if 
not enhanced.42 Accordingly, there is a similar need to interpret private law together 
39. Emma Seery et al., Oxfam Int’l, Even it up: Time to End Extreme Inequality 38 (Mark Fried 
et al. eds., 2014), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/even-it-up-inequality-oxfam.pdf.
40. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 39 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press 2014) (2013).
41. Id. at 40. Equally important is Piketty’s observation that “[t]his episode reminds us, if we needed 
reminding, that the question of what share of output should go to wages and what share to profits—in 
other words, how should the income from production be divided between labor and capital?—has 
always been at the heart of distributional conflict.” Id. at 39.
42. See Karl Klare, Critical Perspectives on Social and Economic Rights, Democracy and Separation of Powers, in 
Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries 3, 15, 17–21 (Helena 
Alviar García et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice]. 
Klare provides that:
[D]emocracy is not compatible with poverty or steep inequalities . . . [H]uman wants, 
identities, and life choices are endogenous to social, political, and cultural orders. The 
experience of democratic participation can enlarge people’s context-transcending 
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with customary law, which, according to Michelman, provides “the encompassing 
background law that frames and guides the daily lives and dealings of most South 
Africans most of the time.”43
 Any analysis of the courts’ future role must focus upon these questions of 
democracy and participation. I focus next on a select series of recent decisions delivered 
by the Constitutional Court and one decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal.
iii. thE ChaLLEngEs pOsEd bY thE pUbLiC dOMain
 National Treasury v. Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance gave the Constitutional 
Court an opportunity to develop its approach to constitutional review in the context 
of an e-tolling controversy.44 The executive Cabinet had decided to upgrade roads in 
Gauteng to be financed on the basis of a “user pay” principle.45 In response, the 
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance, among others, sought and obtained an interim 
interdict restraining the collection of tolls on the roads.46 In setting aside the interim 
interdict, Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke stated:
[T]he duty of determining how public resources are to be drawn upon and 
re-ordered lies in the heartland of Executive Government function and 
domain. What is more, absent any proof of unlawfulness or fraud or 
corruption, the power and the prerogative to formulate and implement policy 
on how to finance public projects reside in the exclusive domain of the 
National Executive subject to budgetary appropriations by Parliament.47
 In similar fashion, the Court in Mazibuko v. Sisulu refused to mandate the Speaker 
of Parliament to hold a debate on a motion of no confidence against the President at a 
particular time as prescribed by the Court.48 While the Constitution provides for a 
motion of no confidence against the President when supported by a majority of the 
capacities. Choices made in giving institutional shape to democracy can therefore affect 
people’s sense of themselves, their needs, and their possibilities. A democratic society 
should aspire in its institutional design to awaken and nurture people’s capacities for 
learning, agency, and self-determination. At the same time, experiences of self-
determination in individual life can alter the wants, beliefs, and identities people bring 
to democratic participation.
 Id. at 15.
43. Michelman, supra note 7, at 246. “Customary law” means indigenous law, and in particular the law of 
marriage, succession, and property practiced by indigenous communities.
44. 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC).
45. Id. at para. 5. For more on the e-tolling and user pay system, see Nickolaus Bauer, E-tolling Regulations 
are ‘Overkill,’ Says NCG, Mail & Guardian (Jan. 18, 2012), http://mg.co.za/article/2012-01-18-
etolling-regulations-are-overkill-says-ncf.
46. Opposition to Urban Tolling All., 2012 (6) SA 223 at paras. 7–8. This interim interdict was granted 
pending a final determination of an application to review and set aside the decision to declare Gauteng 
roads as toll roads. Id.
47. Id. at para. 67.
48. 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) at para. 82.
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National Assembly (“Assembly”),49 neither the Constitution nor the Rules of 
Parliament provided for a mechanism by which a minority party in Parliament could 
introduce this kind of motion, hence the litigation.50 The Court was careful in its 
justification for intervention in the proceedings of the Assembly. While it required 
the Assembly to remedy a constitutional defect that threatened the rights of the 
Assembly members—namely the rights to move a motion of no confidence in the 
President and to institute a rule which would provide for the holding and conduct 
thereof—it rejected the idea that a court could instruct Parliament as to when it was 
to hold such a debate.51
 Two recent decisions further support the view that the courts have sought to craft 
a constitutional framework within which the other arms of the state must operate. In 
AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings Ltd v. Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency, the Court insisted on a careful examination of compliance with 
legal requirements for a tender process.52 The Court held that compliance with the 
mandate for black economic empowerment credentials was an important consideration 
in the ultimate award of the tender and one that required “substantive participation in 
the management and running of any enterprise.”53 The Court rejected the deferential 
approach to procurement that had been adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
insisted on a careful scrutiny of compliance with the substance of tender procedures.54 
In the words of Justice Johan Froneman, writing for the majority:
Substantive empowerment, not mere formal compliance, is what matters. It 
makes a mockery of true empowerment if two opposite ends of the spectrum 
are allowed to be passed off as compliance with the substantive demands of 
empowerment. The one is a misrepresentation that historically disadvantaged 
people are in control and exercising managerial power even when that is not the 
case. That amounts to exploitation. The other is to misrepresent that people 
who hold political power necessarily also possess managerial and business skills. 
Neither situation advances the kind of economic empowerment that the 
Procurement and Empowerment Acts envisage. Both employ charades.55
In more general terms, the Court noted that, in a prevailing context of corruption, the 
promotion of enhanced principles of accountability and transparency is critical: “[I]t 
ensures fairness to participants in the bid process . . . enhances the likelihood of 
efficiency . . . [and] serves as a guardian against a process skewed by corrupt influences.”56
49. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 102(2) (“If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its 
members, passes a motion of no confidence in the President, the President and the other members of the 
Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must resign.”).
50. See Sisulu, 2013 (6) SA 249 at para. 61.
51. Id. at para. 71.
52. 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC).
53. Id. at para. 22.
54. Id. at paras. 23–27, 55.
55. Id. at para. 55.
56. Id. at para. 27. 
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 In National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v. Southern African 
Human Rights Litigation Centre, the Court unanimously ordered the National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service to investigate a complaint made 
by the Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre involving “allegations of 
torture committed in Zimbabwe by and against Zimbabwean nationals.”57 The 
application called upon the Court to establish South Africa’s powers and obligations, 
both domestically and internationally, to ensure that perpetrators of international 
crimes—even when committed by foreign nationals beyond the borders of South 
Africa—are accountable under the law.58 The Court found that South Africa was 
“required, where appropriate, to exercise universal jurisdiction in relation to these 
crimes as they offend against the human conscience and our international and 
domestic law obligations” pursuant to “sections 231(4), 232, and 233 of the 
Constitution and various international, [and] regional . . . instruments.”59 The Court 
noted that the International Criminal Court Act, passed by South Africa, provides 
that torture is a crime against humanity.60 Under domestic law, the police also have a 
duty to “investigate . . . high priority crimes [such as] torture.”61
 These cases reveal that courts have recently sought to take seriously the obligation 
imposed upon the executive and the legislature to comply with the country’s 
constitutional commitments and, in particular, the rule of law. For example, when 
the Court was asked to intrude into executive policy or the business of Parliament, it 
refused.62 These decisions, however, did not in any way indicate that the Court is 
presently not up to the challenge of negotiating a path between the political domain 
and the legal terrain.
 The same may not be said about the Court’s socioeconomic rights jurisprudence. 
As noted earlier in Grootboom, the Court developed a model of reasonableness review 
which appeared to be both open ended and f lexible.63 The review called for the 
determination of whether social programs firstly addressed the needs of the poorest 
57. 2015 (1) SA 315 (CC) at para. 4.
58. Id. at para. 74.
59. Id. at para. 40.
60. Id. at paras. 39, 60(a). See generally S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 232 (“Customary international law is law in 
the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”); Implementation 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, Act 27 of 2002 § 4 (S. Afr.) (describing 
the Republic of South Africa’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes).
61. Nat’ l Comm’r of the S. African Police Serv., 2015 (1) SA 315 at para. 60(b).
62. See Nat’ l Treasury v. Opposition to Urban Tolling All. 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at para. 67 (“[A]bsent any 
proof of unlawfulness or fraud or corruption, the power and the prerogative to formulate and implement 
policy on how to finance public projects reside in the exclusive domain of the National Executive subject 
to budgetary appropriations by Parliament.”); Mazibuko v. Sisulu 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) at para. 82 
(holding the Rules of Parliament must be amended to provide for the manner in which a debate on a 
motion of no confidence in the President should be scheduled, but choosing not to order the Speaker to 
hold a debate on the date specified in the relief sought by the applicant).
63. Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at paras. 40–44.
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of the poor.64 The default position was that a failure by government to provide for 
those residents in most urgent need would constitute unreasonable conduct because it 
amounted to an unfair exclusion of the most vulnerable from key social programs.65
 The most recent offering by the Court in Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg,66 
however, gives reason for pause. The Court eschewed the argument that the right of 
access to water would justify a court’s determining the minimum quantity of water 
that must be delivered to residents of a community.67 In articulating its vision of a 
court’s role in socioeconomic rights adjudication, the Court said:
[I]t is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine precisely what the 
achievement of any particular social and economic right entails and what 
steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of the 
right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the 
institutions of government best placed to investigate social conditions in the 
light of available budgets and to determine what targets are achievable in 
relation to social and economic rights.68
The Court explained its decision not to fix a definitive quantitative standard by 
offering the following justif ications: setting a f ixed standard could be 
counterproductive, given that a standard may vary over time and context; the 
government is institutionally better placed than a court to set standards for delivery; 
and it is preferable, as a matter of democratic accountability, for the legislature and 
executive to formulate such standards.69
 Much of the criticism of City of Johannesburg has focused upon its retreat from 
the Grootboom test. For example, critics Sandra Liebenberg and Katharine Young 
write: “In celebrating the f lexibility of the city’s metered, user-pays system for water 
service delivery above the basic minimum, the Court sanctions the administrative 
deftness of a market solution.”70 Another critic, Lucy Williams, has compellingly 
shown that in comparison to German jurisprudence, the Court’s reluctance to engage 
in the budget and its justification for expenditure incurred in provisioning of the 
socioeconomic rights were extremely deferential and did not meet the test under 
Grootboom.71
64. Id. at para. 44.
65. Id.; see also Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) (providing an in-depth analysis of South Africa’s socioeconomic rights jurisprudence).
66. 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
67. Id. at para. 62.
68. Id. at para. 61.
69. Id. at paras. 60–61.
70. Sandra Liebenberg & Katharine G. Young, Adjudicating Social and Economic Rights: Can Democratic 
Experimentalism Help?, in Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice, supra note 42, at 
237, 245.
71. See Lucy A. Williams, The Role of Courts in the Quantitative-Implementation of Social and Economic 
Rights: A Comparative Study, 2 Const. Ct. Rev. 141 (2010).
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 The decisions on regulating tenders, the Speaker’s duties, and South Africa’s 
international law obligations provide a sound foundation for the Court’s supervision 
of a deliberative democracy. The jury is surely out, however, with respect to whether 
City of Johannesburg will promote an increasingly-deferential approach to social 
provisioning so that the core of these questions will continue to be left to policy 
choices made by the legislature and the executive.
iV. priVatE LaW: a barriEr LandsCapE
 If the public law picture is ambivalent, the view is far more gloomy when we turn 
to private law. In Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Security, the Court suggested that 
section 39(2) of the Constitution contained an objective normative framework within 
which all law, particularly the common law, should be developed.72 More than a 
decade later, little has been done to tease out the nature of this normative framework.
 Some commentators have suggested, with a considerable measure of persuasion, 
that the focus of attention in the area of common law should not have been on section 
39(2) of the Constitution—which provides that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, 
and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or 
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”73—but 
rather on section 8 of the Constitution.74
 Under section 8, all law governing disputes between private parties, whether 
enshrined in statute or the common law, must be tested against the substantive 
content of the Bill of Rights in general and the particular provision of the Bill of 
Rights that has been invoked.75 It does not follow, however, that if an existing 
principle of common law is inconsistent with the text, a new rule must be fashioned 
72. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at paras. 39, 54–55.
73. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 39(2).
74. Stu Woolman, The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights, 124 SALJ 762 (2007). Section 8 of the Constitution 
provides:
(1)  The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state.
(2)  A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right.
(3)  When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in 
terms of subsection (2), a court—
 (a)  in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, 
the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; 
and
 (b)  may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the 
limitation is in accordance with section 36 (1). 
(4)  A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required 
by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.
 S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 8.
75. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 8; Woolman, supra note 74, at 773.
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by the courts. The existing rule may be tweaked in order to ensure compliance with 
both sections 8(2) and 8(3) of the Constitution.76 Our private law has suffered the 
worst of two worlds: very little engagement has taken place with section 8, the 
primary horizontal provision in the Constitution,77 and there has been but a vague 
approach to the normative framework of section 39(2) since Carmichele.78
 Given the nature of common law development, one may argue that we should be 
more patient and understand that common law adjudication takes place incrementally 
and not within the context of a transformative gale. Even so, that neither excuses nor 
justifies the largely incoherent approach that courts have taken to the common law—
the Constitutional Court in particular.79
 Whatever the explanation, the incoherence of the existing jurisprudence indicates 
that our courts have not understood that the law is deeply imbricated in every dispute. 
This means that the constitutional mandate to audit the law must be the starting 
point of analysis for a dispute, particularly a dispute between private parties. Courts 
are obliged to test that the law sought to be applied passes constitutional muster—
that it is consistent with the Constitution in general and more particularly with 
whatever right may be applicable in the particular case.
 An excellent example of the courts’ giving constitutional principles a wide berth 
in the area of private law is the case of RH v. DE, a Supreme Court of Appeal case 
dealing with a married person whose spouse had committed adultery.80 The question 
raised was whether it was possible to sue the third party with whom the adultery was 
committed.81 The court decided that South African law was out of step with modern 
76. For the text of section 8(2) and 8(3) of the Constitution, see supra note 74.
77. To my knowledge, the only case which has sought to apply the approach of section 8(2) and 8(3) is 
Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), authored by Justice Kate O’Regan.
78. For excellent critiques of this jurisprudence, see Stu Woolman, Application, in 2 Constitutional Law 
of South Africa 31-1 (Stu Woolman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008) and Nick Friedman, The South African 
Common Law and the Constitution: Revisiting Horizontality, 30 SAJHR 63 (2014).
79. See Woolman, supra note 74, at 762–63. In Barkhuizen v. Napier, the Court was required to determine 
the legality of a time limitation clause in an insurance contract. 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at para. 1. The 
Court failed to analyze the problem in terms of the Constitution’s substantive provisions as required in 
terms of section 8. Woolman, supra note 74, at 772. It also failed to provide meaningful guidance as to 
the manner in which public policy should be infused with constitutional values. See id. at 772–78. In 
NM v. Smith, the applicants claimed that their rights to privacy and dignity were violated when 
respondents published their names and HIV statuses in a biography of a prominent politician. 2007 (5) 
SA 250 (CC) at para. 1. In this case, the evidence did not support a finding that respondents had acted 
with the requisite intent to justify the claim, yet the Court made no attempt to investigate whether the 
constitutional protection of privacy justified a change of the requirement of intent. See Woolman, supra 
note 74, at 781–83. Without such a change in the law, the Court’s finding was at war with the evidence.
80. 2014 (6) SA 436 (SCA). I am indebted to my colleague Professor Jaco Barnard-Naudé for his draft article 
“The Pedigree of the Common Law and the ‘Unnecessary’ Constitution: a Discussion of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s Decision in RH v DE.” (on file with author).
81. RH, 2014 (6) SA 436 at para. 15.
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views on the relationship between the law and adultery and concluded that the time 
had come to abolish the action as far as non-patrimonial damages are concerned.82
 The result is not particularly controversial. It is the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
approach which is problematic. The opinion engaged in a lengthy analysis as to 
whether the rule—which permitted an action for non-patrimonial damages against 
the third party involved in the adultery—found its origin in Roman Dutch law or 
English common law.83 Satisfied that English common law was the source of this 
action, Judge of Appeal Fritz Brand said that there was no need to engage in any 
constitutional analysis because pure Roman Dutch law did not embrace the action.84 
In developing the argument that the boni mores85 dictated against the continuation of 
such an action, Brand stated:
Experience teaches us that different jurisdictions provide more or less the 
same answer to a particular legal problem, albeit that they sometimes arrive at 
that answer in different ways. Where our law therefore gives an answer that 
appears to be directly at odds with what has happened in most other 
jurisdictions, it makes one stop to think: are the morals and the needs of our 
society so different from most others? And if so, why?86
Reading this judgment as a whole, it appears that members of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal consider the common law to have an independent existence. They accept that 
there may be occasions where the common law must be developed according to 
section 39(2) of the Constitution, but the common law can also be developed for 
reasons independent of the Constitution that represent the boni mores of the 
community.87 This, in turn, illustrates the idea of a public morality which informs 
our law but which is not necessarily sourced in the fundamental normative framework 
that underpins the entire legal system—namely the Constitution.88
V. COnCLUsiOn
 After twenty years of democracy, South Africa possesses a political system 
dominated by one party that is unlikely to lose political office in the foreseeable 
future. This development, combined with the lack of unification within the non-
governmental sector—many components of which still see the governing party as a 
82. Id. at paras. 40–41.
83. Id. at paras. 20–28.
84. See id. at paras. 38–40.
85. Boni mores refers to “good mores” or “a combination of traditions, customs and various unwritten rules . . . 
held in high regard by Roman jurists.” Roberto Perrone, Public Morals and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 47 Isr. L. Rev. 361, 361 (2014).
86. RH, 2014 (6) SA 436 at para. 28.
87. See id. at paras. 17–18.
88. This approach shows a remarkable degree of continuity with that adopted in Nat’ l Media Ltd. v. Bogoshi 
1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA).
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liberation movement—has rendered political warfare ineffective in promoting the 
core constitutional vision.
 Politics appear to deliver little to many, and, as evident in the plethora of cases 
that have descended upon the courts, lawfare has become the default strategy.89 
Given the current political terrain, this turn to lawfare is unlikely to abate over the 
next decade. This raises the question as to whether the constitutional structure which 
has been developed—particularly during the first decade of democracy—is 
sufficiently sturdy to carry the weight of these demands.
 By way of recourse to two leading approaches, one by Roux and another by Klare, 
this paper has sought to examine the constitutional possibilities for the next two 
decades. Even if Roux is correct that the Court was required to develop an 
institutional legitimacy in its first decade, the political context in that first decade is 
manifestly no more. The challenges are greater, the strain is more evident, and the 
demands for the Court to keep alive the transformative constitutional vision, as 
described by Klare, have become more apparent.
 The jurisprudence developed to meet these challenges can be fairly described as 
ambivalent. When considering the background rules of private law—which play such 
an important role in the distribution of wealth in society—the reluctance of the 
courts to forge ahead more courageously and develop a better and more coherent 
jurisprudence is truly regrettable. Whether courts will obtain another chance in the 
presently-fraught political circumstances is open to question. To date, the courts 
have held the line against intrusions by the executive and legislature into the domain 
of deliberative democracy, but key and more demanding challenges lie ahead. 
 Not all is lost, but increased political pressure coupled with new judicial 
appointments pose unpredictable challenges in the constitutional roadmap for South 
African democracy.
89. See generally Nat’ l Comm’r of the S. African Police Serv. v. S. African Human Rights Litig. Ctr. 2015 (1) SA 
315 (CC) (addressing the government’s duty to promote human rights in its foreign affairs); Mazibuko v. 
Sisulu 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) (addressing the Rules of Parliament with regard to a motion of no 
confidence); Democratic All. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) (addressing the 
appointment of the National Director of Public Prosecutions); Glenister v. President of the Republic of S. 
Afr. 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) (addressing Parliament’s obligation to create an independent anti-corruption 
unit); Judicial Serv. Comm’n v. Cape Bar Council 2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA) (addressing procedures for 
appointment to judicial office); Democratic All. v. S. African Broad. Corp. 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) 
(addressing the pension of the Chief Operations Officer of the South African Broadcasting Corporation).
